In this paper, we introduce the variety of $I$-modal ririgs. We characterize the congruence lattice of its members by means of $I$-filters, and we provide a description of $I$-filter generation. We also provide an axiomatic presentation for the variety generated by chains of the subvariety of contractive $I$-modal ririgs. Finally, we introduce a Hilbert-style calculus for a logic with $I$-modal ririgs as an equivalent algebraic semantics and we prove that such a logic has the parametrized local deduction-detachment theorem.

Here we focus on two questions: What is the proper semantics for deontic modal expressions in English? And what is the connection between true deontic modal statements and normative reasons? Our contribution towards thinking about the first, which makes up the bulk of our paper, considers a representative sample of recent challenges to a Kratzer-style formal semantics for modal expressions, as well as the rival views—Fabrizio Cariani’s contrastivism, John MacFarlane’s relativism, and Mark Schroeder’s ambiguity theory—those challenges are thought to motivate. (...) These include the Professor Procrastinate challenge to Inheritance (the principle that ‘If ought p and p entails q, then ought q), as well as Parfit’s miners puzzle regarding information-sensitive deontic modals. Here we argue that a Kratzer-style view is able to meet all of the challenges we’ll consider. In addition, we’ll identify challenges for each of those rival views. Our overall conclusion is that a Kratzer-style semantics remains the one to beat. With this assumption in place, we then ask how we should understand the relationship between true deontic modal statements and normative reasons. Should, for example, we hold that the truth of such a statement entails the existence of a normative reason for some agent to comply? Here we argue that, in many cases, acceptance of Kratzer’s semantics for deontic modals leaves open for substantive normative theorizing the question of whether an agent has a normative reason to comply with what she ought to do. (shrink)

Our goal here is to help identify the contextualist’s most worthy competitor to relativism. Recently, some philosophers of language and linguists have argued that, while there are contextualist-friendly semantic theories of deontic modals that fit with the relativist’s challenge data, the best such theories are not Lewis-Kratzer-style semantic theories. If correct, this would be important: It would show that the theory that has for many years enjoyed the status of the default view of modals in English and other languages is (...) in need of revision. Here we defend the default view by showing how a Kratzer-style semantics is able to make available readings of the relevant utterances that fit with the pretheoretical judgments opponents purport it cannot fully capture. Having established this, we turn to considering the more theoretical grounds proponents have offered for preferring their rival contextualist views. Here the question is to what extent such grounds favor semantic over what Korta and Perry call “near-side pragmatic” explanations of our judgments. In particular, we argue that our favored readings figure in near-side pragmatic explanations of those judgments that possess the methodological and theoretical advantages of systematicity and unity at least as well as, if not to a greater extent than, those of opponents who argue for their revised semantic theories on the basis of these advantages. (shrink)

The contributions in the first part Re-modelling logic of this volume take account of formal logic in the theory of rational argumentation.

Genealogía y lógica de la ratio imperial romana -- Racionalización ética judía y religión de salvación cristiana -- La revolución teológica de Pablo y sus consecuencias -- Teología política imperial y militancia cristiana -- La teología trinitaria y el destino de la teología imperial -- Hilario, Ambrosio y el camino del catolicismo en Occidente -- Mal y salvación: Augstín de Hipona.

Physical arguments stemming from the theory of black-hole thermodynamics are used to put constraints on the dynamics of closed-string tachyon condensation in Scherk–Schwarz compactifications. A geometrical interpretation of the tachyon condensation involves an effective capping of a noncontractible cycle, thus removing the very topology that supports the tachyons. A semiclassical regime is identified in which the matching between the tachyon condensation and the black-hole instability flow is possible. We formulate a generalized correspondence principle and illustrate it in several different circumstances: (...) an Euclidean interpretation of the transition from strings to black holes across the Hagedorn temperature and instabilities in the brane-antibrane system. (shrink)

Conference held June 1990 under the auspices of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Four papers that first appeared elsewhere, though within the last few years. Probably the best source for Chomsky’s recent technical work and a good source for his recent views about linguistic theory and about language and cognition generally. The introduction and the first two essays, "Questions of Form and Interpretation" and "On the Nature of Language," speak to the more general questions and the linguistics will not overburden the philosophical reader. From the middle sixties to the early seventies, many linguists (...) proposed ever more abstract and idiosyncratic syntactical analyses, often invoking vague and overly powerful "rules" without much concern for how they could fit within a learnable system of rules. What motivated these linguists was a desire to give some account within a rich grammar for nearly any sort of semantic, logical, or cognitive feature that comes up in our use of language. Much of Chomsky’s recent work has been concerned with a principled reduction in the power of grammatical rules; since this reduces the sorts of rules and grammars that may be proposed, it makes grammatical analyses more testable. The reduction is "principled" in that what one is after are the universal constraints of human language that derive from the child’s language acquisition capacities. In "Conditions on Transformations" and "Conditions on Rules of Grammar" Chomsky proposes various limitations on the power of transformational rules within the context of a similarly-restricted base. The logico-semantic role in the strict explication of linguistic competence is restricted to "logical form," which is read off a surface level of syntax into something like the familiar structures of predicate logic. The trace theory of movement rules is a powerful and relatively simple way of accounting for features of pronominalization and anaphor, reference and logical form, without sacrificing testability or system; it also permits the expression of some elegant generalizations and lends itself to the exploitation of the universal—particular grammar distinction. Trace theory also permits logical form to be read off from surface structure alone. And the logical form so read off appears to be the familiar variable-employing one and not the sort suggested by Montague.—J.L. (shrink)

J. L. Austin, in "Ifs and Cans," proclaimed the common hope that we soon "may see the birth, through the joint labors of philosophers, grammarians, and numerous other students of language, of a true and comprehensive science of language." The problem has always been with the "joint labors" part. Philosophers have always been willing to issue linguists dictums and linguists have been happy to teach philosophers "plain facts." Austin’s general view of language, and his particular notion of performative utterance, can (...) be found in the writing of J. R. Firth, the most commanding British linguist of Austin’s generation, but Austin never refers to Firth. In the present volume, however, we find clear and exciting evidence of genuinely joint labors on the part of philosophers and linguists. They stem from a summer conference in 1969 rounded out with contributions from notables. To two thick issues of Synthese the editors have added a dazzling piece by Saul Kripke, two substantial pieces by James McCawley and J. R. Ross, a short paper by Paul Ziff, and a reprint of P. F. Strawson’s "Grammar and Philosophy." This is an invaluable book and the best book among the many now available concerning the interaction of linguistics and philosophy: worth the cost, which the contributors attempted to reduce through foregoing royalties. The philosophers in this volume hold, or hold intriguing, the view that the semantics of a natural language can and must, in effect, be a theory of truth for a language in much the manner that Tarski suggested, and provided, for artificial language: the recursive specification of biconditionals in which the left hand gives the structural description of an object language sentence and the right hand, the truth conditions in the metalanguage. In "homophonic" translation this requirement can be trivially satisfied simply by mentioning the sentence on the left that one uses on the right: one makes the requirement non-trivial by forcing enough into the recursive specification so that one captures the native speaker’s implicit semantic competence. In this volume, the "orthodox" Davidsonian program, which takes the syntax of the metalanguage to be standard predicate logic, is ably argued by John Wallace ; Richard Montague, David Lewis, and Jaakko Hintikka would want an intensional logic covering modality and propositional attitudes. The linguists who find this philosophical climate most appealing are called "generative semanticists": McCawley, Ross, George Lakoff and others argue that any proposed semantic rule will eventually prove necessary to syntax too and that, hence, the deepest level of syntactical form will be equivalent to semantic form. Whatever the ultimate fate of this joint program, it leads here to much exciting interaction between linguists and philosophers: linguists who welcome the machinery and conceptual standards of modern logic, and philosophers who try to grasp the specifics of crucial issues in recent linguistic theory. Even if Quine’s doubts, here sketched, and Chomsky’s currently unpublished more technical objections should be well-founded, nonetheless the joint labor will have been very much worthwhile. Aside from this general debate about semantics, there are several papers covering more specific issues. The papers of J. A. Fodor, Terence Parsons, and Ross concern adverbs and the logical form of action sentences; several papers, particularly B. H. Partee’s, examine "Opacity, Coreference, and Pronouns." In all these papers one notes the fulfillment of Austin’s hope that philosophic and linguistic arguments should become intermixed, if not at times properly indistinguishable. Perhaps the most enjoyable and exciting paper stands aside from linguistics: Saul Kripke’s "Naming and Necessity." Kripke here argues quite informally for the separation of analytic, a priori, and necessary that is required for a Kripke style, S5, modal logic with de re modalities. "Gold is a yellow metal," for example, turns out to be contingent, while "Heat is the motion of particles" is necessary but a posteriori ; and that philosopher’s stone of stones, "The morning star is the evening star," is discovered to be necessary but a posteriori.—J. L. (shrink)

1. Causal knowledge is an indispensable element in science. Causal assertions are embedded in both the results and the procedures of scientific investigation. 2. It is therefore worthwhile to investigate the meaning of causal statements and the ways in which we can arrive at causal knowledge.

J.L. Schellenberg offers a path to a new kind of religious outlook. Reflection on our early stage in the evolutionary process leads to skepticism about religion, but also offers a new answer to the problem of faith and reason, and the possibility of a new, evolutionary form of religion.